Abstract
countries in both categories" (Brasilia Declaration 2003) ; 2) the view that international conflicts should be solved by diplomatic means; and 3) the concern that globalization has not brought benefits to large parts of the world. This document expressed what would be the "cornerstones of the BRICS initiative" (Mielzniczuk 2013 (Mielzniczuk :1087 : development and multipolarity. In 2006, Brazil, Russia, India, and China established a discursive alignment (Mielzniczuk 2013 (Mielzniczuk :1087 around these two notions. This alignment-despite the considerable differences among the four countries-was crucial to the formalization of the Group in the 2009 first summit of Ekaterinburg, in Russia. In 2009, the 2008 financial crisis reinforced the claims for a reformation of the international economic order. In fact, during this summit, the leaders discussed the global crisis claiming that the Bretton Woods institutions should be reformed and that emergent countries should have more participation in the decisions to be taken. There seems to be a consensus on the fact that what led Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to become a formal political group was the idea that their representation in the world political institutions should be proportional to their weight in the global economy. Obviously, one should not expect similarities among these countries, given their enormous differences both in the geographical regions in which they are located and in their history. Here, we do not have time or the necessary expertise to go into these differences. Instead, in order to give an idea of the disparities between the BRICS, we will focus on the relative economic sizes of each country, as shown in Table 1 . Each country has its particular political, economic and geopolitical conditions and objectives. Table 1 shows that China accounted for 58.75% of the group GDP in 2013, while Brazil accounted for 14.37%; Russia contribution was 13.41% and India and South Africa represented 11.04% and 2.44%, respectively. If Brazil, Russia and India have similar weight, the participation of South Africa can be considered small. Disparities in international economic projection are even more evident when the indicator is the BRICS outflow of foreign direct investment (million US$). In 2012, with an amount of US$ 87,804 million, China accounted for 77.83% of foreign direct investment and was responsible for 73.58% of international reserves of the Group. In imports and exports values of goods and commercial services, China accounted for 60.25% of the amount of the group in 2012. The analysis of external trade and services among the BRICS countries also shows the centrality of China, as can be seen in Table 2 . For Barma et al., besides these differences, "for the first time in a century, a set of large, populous, and increasingly wealthy countries-this time China, India, and Russia-are on the cusp of achieving, or regaining, great power status" (2009: 577). Brazil and South Africa are out of the list, for the simple reason that they are regional powers, at best.
The literature has also investigated the extent to which the BRICS constitute a group. For Käkönen (2013:15) , due to the lack of high cohesion and political and economic complementarity, "it is still difficult to see the BRICS as an institution that would seriously challenge the existing international order. It is rather an institution for advancing diverse individual national interests of the member states." Along the same lines, Brütsch and Papa (2012: 2) see the BRICS as a platform for "individual gains than for more equitable and fair global order." In the words of Laidi this is due to the fact that China, Russia and India are, in many senses, "competing powers that share one common interest: to erode the Western hegemonic claims" (2011:1).
The differences have led the authors to build a pessimistic evaluation of the future of the BRICS. Armijo states that "the four do not share domestic political institutions, international goals, or economic structures and challenges " (2007:38) . Barma et al. (2009) and Laidi (2012) observe that the BRICS see their national sovereignty threatened by Western hegemony. If on the one hand this is a point of convergence, on the other hand it is a barrier to institutionalization and formalization that demands concessions or at least, flexibility in sovereignty, which is also an obstacle to the definition of common political objectives (Laidi 2012 Fonseca Jr. sees the BRICS as "an informal association far from being a multilateral organism," with an international presence in two dimensions: one internal to the group, represented by cooperation in health, energy an legal issues, and another external, in which the group would be a platform that would act in a coordinated manner to make proposals and claims in order to influence multilateral organizations decisions, especially in the financial area (2012:17) .
This brief review of literature shows that the BRICS are a kind of new enigma to be deciphered. Maybe this is the reason why Armijo (2007:40) came to the conclusion that "the category of "the BRICs" is thus, strictly speaking, a mirage-but one that nonetheless has provided considerable insight. For the present, perhaps we should keep it."
Brazil in the BRICS under the World-Systems Analysis
The study of the BRICS under world-systems analysis raises the question of whether this perspective, whose main concern is structural change and the longue durèe, can be applied to such a new phenomenon-one that, precisely for being new, lacks a clear identity, as we demonstrated in the previous section. The methodological answer to this question is to approach the BRICS as a product of a particular conjuncture of the capitalist world-economy and to insert this conjuncture in the structure. To do so, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the world-system but the five countries as well, and their relations with each other and the entire world-system. Due to space and time constraints, we limit our analysis to Brazil. Along with Russia, Brazil had a leading role in the creation of BRICS. Why did it take this initiative? The answer must be sought in the economic and political conjuncture of both Brazil and the world-economy.
The foreign policy of Lula da Silva's government After being defeated three times in presidential elections, in 2002 Lula understood that to win elections he needed to gain the confidence of the opposition and the business community, which were daunted by the leftist and statist ideology of the PT. Four months before the 2002 election, Lula published the "Letter to Brazilians" in which he stressed changes that he would promote but made clear his commitment to inflation control and fiscal balance. He had decided to continue the economic policies of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose government (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) shrank the state and created legal regulations to control public accounts, such as the fiscal responsibility law passed in 2000. If in the field of economic policies Lula was practically obliged to follow the haute finance orientations, in foreign affairs he was free to implement his own ideas, which were close to those of PT:
The Workers' Party [PT] has always shown strong commitment to international issues, especially for its criticism to programs of multilateral economic institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, or the free trade promotion projects led by developed countries. Moreover, the notion that the country's foreign policy should determine the national project of a popular and democratic government was strongly disseminated within the party (Moreira Jr. 2013: 4) . According to Soares de Lima and Hirst (2006: 21) , at the end of Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidential term in 2002, there was a consensus in the Brazilian foreign policy community, that the country should occupy a more influential position in the world politics. There was no consensus, however, on the best strategy to do so. For some, Brazil should search for credibility, while others suggested an "active development policy" (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006:21), through collaboration with countries of similar economic level. As we will see, Lula's government embraced the second way.
In his inauguration speech, Lula stated that the priorities of his government in foreign affairs would include South America integration, the deepening of relations with developing nations such as China, India, Russia and South Africa, the enhancement of multilateral organizations, especially the UN, which should be responsible for ensuring international peace and security. Lula also claimed that the international crisis should be negotiated by a reformed UN Security Council. In "Concepts and Strategies of Lula's government diplomacy," a paper written by Celso Amorim 15 months after Lula's inauguration, we find the guidelines for foreign policy in Lula's government: (1) Diplomacy as an instrument to support the country economic and social development project (Amorim 2004:41) ; (2) South America integration as an imperative which "should be also seen as a mobilization able to enhance our relationships with other nations and groups of nations" (Amorim 2004:42) . (3) Regional cohesion as a means to increase the probability of being heard in commercial multilateral negotiations and in the making of an international order.
(4) Africa as a priority; (5) Hunger and poverty as focus of international movements and (6) Multilateral institutions as an aspect to be strengthened. Lula's government went beyond these words and practiced an "audacious and, sometimes, irreverent" (Amorim 2010a: 216) we must deal (Amorim 2011: 267-268) .
It is worthy to note how this interpretation of the world political situation is close to that of Arrighi and other scholars, including the use of the term hegemony, albeit probably not in the sense Arrighi employs that word.
The U.S. relative decline was seen by Lula government as an opportunity to place Brazil among the multiplicity of power poles referred by Amorim above.
But we need to be fair with Arrighi and observe that at least since the 1990s (but certainly from 2001) the hegemony decline entered a phase of domination without hegemony (Arrighi 2007 Armstrong (2002:76) 
The Plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful.
As Harvey (2003) and Arrighi (2007) Coupled with the awareness of the "limited influence Brazil might have" not only on the invasion of Iraq but on the world politics as a whole, U.S. unilateralism gives meaning to Brazilian insistence in multipolarity, enforcement of international law through the UN Security Council, reformation of Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, WB), and the creation of international institutions and dialogue fórum as well. Brazil's strategy was to join other countries that also felt threatened by the U.S. imperial project. As was seen above, the BRICS are significant due to the relevance of the component countries-mainly China, Russia and India-among the institituions created by this strategy.
In sum, it is our contention that under Lula, Brazil has taken the decision of being a more influential actor in global politics and has turned this decision into actions. In this sense, it is possible to say that, contrary to what Hurrel (2000) has argued, Brazil has gone beyond rethoric.
Nonetheless the question regarding how far Brazil has advanced remains. Does the country have the means to support the initiatives listed above or would it be it one of these States "whose ambitions run ahead of their material capabilities" instead? (Hurrel 2006: 2) . The answer to this question will be offered in the next section.
Lula's Government belle époque
Besides political will and a favorable international context, the Brazilian active and proud foreign policy needed human and financial resources. According to Minister Amorim, the number of Besides "creativity and assertiveness" (Amorim 2010: 217) , such an intense and extensive foreign policy needed financial support. How could Brazil, a semiperipheral State with an always swinging financial health, obtain these resources? The resources were provided by the economic growth that took place precisely in Lula's two presidential terms and that was allowed by a systemic condition, the Chinese demand of commodities from which Brazil took advantage. As shown in Table 3, although not Chinese economy the engine that carried an unusual amount of foreign exchange to Brazil and this, in turn, made it possible for President Lula to couple, on the one hand, the interests of finance capital (balance in public finances, the control of inflation, high primary surplus, decrease of public debt) 3 with, on the other hand, the adoption of policies contrary to liberal prescriptions, such as an increase of investment capacity of state-owned enterprises, mainly in the energy sector (oil, electricity and gas), the strengthening of public banks and their use to finance production and consumption, and the internationalization of Brazilian big companies, in addition to the stimulation of the internal market through the enhancement of the minimum wage (which, between 2004 and 2014 had a real increase of 70%) and the expansion of income transfer programs (Bastos 2015) .
For instance, the "Bolsa Família" program "was extended to 11 million households, nearly tripling its scope" (Fonseca, Cunha and Bichara 2013: 409) . In sum, the great flow of resources from the trade balance allowed a win-win situation.
As an exceptional politician, Lula knew how to take advantage of the abundance of foreign The president seemed to express a perception shared by almost everyone, everywhere, in Brazil and abroad. For Fonseca, Cunha and Bichara (2013: 419) , the agency rating decision was "consistent with the analysis of multilateral agencies [IMF, UNCTAD], market analysts and academics." Facing this unanimity, the same authors came to the conclusion that it seemed that O'Neill's prediction was correct: Brazil was showing that it could be an important BRICS member.
In this atmosphere of euphoria, Lula ended his presidency with an approval of 83% (Datafolha, December 20, 2010) and elected Dilma Rousseff, a technician that had never run an election before. However, with the change of winds, the trade balance fell sharply, as shown in figure 1.
Since trade balance was the source of Brazilian economic dynamism, with this fall the belle époque came to an end. When President Dilma Rousseff took office in January 2011, she "kept the macroeconomic policy framework anchored in the inflation target and primary fiscal surplus and floating (dirty) exchange rate" (Cagnin et al. 2013:169) . However, in the second semester of 2011, facing a marked slowdown in the domestic economic activity and an international backdrop of great uncertainty due to the deepening of the euro zone financial crisis, President Dilma started a set of countercyclical policies that were not in the orthodox recipe and that Singer (2013:43) has called a "developmentalist experiment." For our purposes, it is not necessary to present the details of these policies but we will highlight what we find are important aspects.
The End of Lula's belle époque
The first aspect concerns the monetary policy implemented by President Dilma Rousseff.
She opted for government intervention to force the fall of basic interest to levels closer to international interest rates. The state banks were encouraged to compel private banks through competition in order to mantain the credit supply at lower interest rates. The President and her
Minister of Economy made public statements against the high interest rates and private bank profits. In addition to making overtly political a topic that is usually considered economic-the level of interest rates-with this move the President attacked the haute finance and she herself gave her goverment "the right to intervene in the quintessence of capitalism, namely the profit" (Singer 2013: 51) . The second aspect is related to her effort to combat inflation keeping artificially low administered prices (gasoline, electricity), which were not corrected according to the costs. In December 4 of the same year, Antonio Delfim Netto, who served as Minister of Economy in the dictatoship period, but then very close to Lula and an advocate of industry, offered a positive evaluation of the policies mentioned above and considered as "really tragic" the fact that investiments decreased in the last five quarters. In disagreement with The Economist, the problem for him was not the activism of the government which, in his opinion, in general was correct, but the government's lack of communication skills. The inability of the government to communicate properly with the productive and financial sectors was resposible for the "widespread idea in the financial sector and the real sector of the economy that the government's policy objective was to expand its action, set prices, regulate and control private activity, and expand the "nationalization of strategic sectors" (Delfim Netto 2012)." Without the anti-state prejudice, Delfim Netto argued in favor of the view that the private sector was in the center of Dilmas Rouseff strategy for development, as claimed by Bastos (2015) . What Delfim Netto viewed as a communication problem, Singer (2015:43) calls an ideological war that mobilized powerful local and international forces against the "developmentalist experiment."
In March 2013, former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), the pope of the opposition party, stated that the government exaggerated in the intervention measures and was becoming purely authoritarian. Would not PT be "repeating the mistake [when it opposed FHC's government reformations] of having a myopic reading of the world and a distorted role of the state?" he asked (Cardoso 2013: A2) . The problem was the excessive state activism.
Delfim Netto hopes faded fast. The split between the government and the capital (financial and industrial) did not diminish and in the second half of 2013 "from the the financial sector to the industrial one, through agrobusiness, trade and services, the capitalist union was complete around cuts in public spending, drop in the value of work and decrease of protection for workers" (Singer 2013: 61) .
Despite the June 2013 riots and the scandal of corruption at Petrobrás, a state oil company which is also the largest company of the country, Dilma Rousseff was able to win the elections by convincing her voters that her main opponent would make Brazil step backwards in the fight against long-standing problems such as inflation, unemployment, inequality and, worst of all, dependency on the IMF (Singer 2015: 57) . Upon taking office, she opted for an orthodox economist for the position of Ministry of Economy, clearly, a demonstration of the intention to apply austerity policies-avoided in her first term-so that the government could build trust.
However, the decision to bury the developmental experiment was not accepted by PTincluding former President Lula-and the new Minister did not receive the support to adopt the liberal recipe. As a result, uncertainty gripped economy. In addition, investment and consumption fell, whereas inflation and unemployment grew. In parallel with this economic turmoil, a political crisis started to develop quickly. Needless to say, this radical change in Dilma Rousseff's position, the economic difficulties, and the scandals of corruption provoked a storm of protest against the government and PT.
The disagreement inside the economic team-and the President inability to define the course of her economic policy-became evident when the 2016 budget sent by the government to the Congress presented a deficit of R$ 30.5 billion instead of a surplus of 0.7% that had been promised. In any event, what seems certain is that not only Lula's belle époque has ended, but also that the political party that supported Lula's has left the scene. In our view, the burial of the developmental experiment is the price President Dilma had to pay to finance capitalism in order to continue in office. Her continuity as President of Brazil is, as of the writing of this paper, uncertain. If she gets to remain President, her economic policy will be aligned to those of the financial capital, as was the case under Lula. If she leaves office, the next president will do the same. In sum, in the coming years the Brazilian government will not return to face the haute finance again. The haute finance has clearly recovered from the shock of 2008 and continues to have the support of the central states, as is evident in the management of the euro crisis. The consequences of the end of Lula's belle époque and of the termination of the developmental experiment for the position of Brazil in the BRICS will be addressed in the next section.
Brazil in the BRICS in a Post PT Period
With the political and moral defeat of PT, the Brazilian Social-Democrat Party (PSDB) will very likely return to power. The PSDB political-economic program is aligned with the financial capital.
However, besides the alignment in the field of management of the economy, PSDB also has a very different view on how foreign policy should be conducted. As noted above, the foreign policy of Lula's government, which under Dilma Roussef changed only in intensity and not in direction, The PT government, without saying so, put all its chips in the "decline of the West." For him this is a misreading since the United States has moved forward and will continue to lead the global capitalist economy. In this case, to be relevant, countries should integrate the U.S. Having lasted for more than a century and seen as positive for the country, during this long time, the cooperation with the United States has been reaching and benefiting more and more individuals, social groups and businessmen. In this perspective, it is possible to assess the extent of the resistance to the PT's foreign policy which gave priority to the relationship with other countries, some of which (Russia and China and India on a lesser scale) the United States has great differences with.
In sum, as the Lula's belle époque and Dilma's developmentalist experiment were defeated by the capitalist world-economy conjuncture of financial expansion, PT foreign policy could not change one of Brazil's foreign policy structural feature, namely, the convergence with the United
States. For the dominant classes and the people benefited by this convergence, the risks of a confrontation with the United States would be too high and the gains too uncertain. Therefore, it is better to continue along the established path.
Final Remarks
The BRICs are one result of China's emergence in a conjuncture of the world-economy characterized by the hegemonic decline of the United States, which no longer are "truly primus inter paris, one power [that] can largely impose its rules, and its wishes (at very least by effective vecto power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas" (Wallerstein 1991:39) . It was the perception of this impossibility and the implied threats in the 5 "Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Baron of Rio Branco, Brazil's foremost diplomat in the final decades of the monarchy, its foreign minister from 1902 to 1912, and founder of its first modern diplomatic corps" (Sotero and Armijo 2007:49) .
United States attempt to replace hegemony by domination that motivated the BRICS to come together as a means to enlarge their influence on interstate system and contain the U.S. expansionism. The evidence for a correlation between dominance without hegemony and the emergence of the BRICS is the fact that the constitution of the IBSA Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) took place right after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Although focusing only on the political dimension and thus on the interstate system, the literature reviewed allows us to conclude that the BRICS countries differ widely in terms of geopolitical interests and economic, political and military power, which prevents the development of common objectives with regard to global order, despite the shared need to contain the American power. In addition to these differences, the five countries are involved in political articulation processes and economic integration at the regional level, which tend to be prioritized in relation to the BRICS. The economic integration among the BRICS countries has been historically low and so will continue for some time, with the exception of the economic integration of the four countries (as well the rest of the world) with China. China is the country that gives importance and credibility to the Group. The BRICS is just one of the forums in which China is involved and it is probably not the most important.
The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) allows us to conclude that the global financial order is a theme around which the BRICS are unified. The NDB and the CRA appear to be targeting the second pillar of U.S. dominance without hegemony, that is, the control on the world currency, World Bank, and IMF.
The strength of the BRICS is constituted by the strength of each member and the synergies between the individual capabilities. Actually, the cells of this possible organism called BRICS are the countries that constitute them. Therefore, if we study one of these countries we are studying the Group. With this idea in mind we examined the motivations of Brazil and the resources it can offer to the Group.
Within the motivations, through the statements of President Lula and Foreign Minister
Celso Amorim, we could see that Brazil wanted to have more relevance on the interstate system and that Brazil's foreign policy presupposed the decline of American hegemony and the need to oppose unilateralism proposed by President Bush (the son). To this end, Brazil insisted on strengthening the UN and its Security Council, which should be reformed to reflect the new configuration of world power, characterized by the existence of multiple centers of power, as the components of the BRICS.
But Brazil is a country that perfectly fits the description of semiperiphery offered by Wallerstein: There are also semiperipheral areas which are in between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions, such as the complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machinery, cultural integrity, etc (2011:349).
However, to Lula's Government, the structural constraints posed by the semiperipherical and structural condition could be overcome if Brazil joined political coalitions with other semiperipheral and peripheriferal entities. Besides the political will to take advantage of the possibility of mobilizing other countries against U.S. dominance without establishing a new hegemony, Lula Government had the resources provided mainly by commodity exports to China.
While this systemic condition lasted, Brazil could play an international role that could not be expected from a State that after a strengthening period from 1930 to 1990, has been weakened since then by the liberal reformation. In fact, for a while, the belle époque of the commodity chain could hide Brazil structural weakenesses.
Lula's government tried to circumvent this restriction through coalitions with stronger semiperipheral states from other continents which have very different histories and with whom Brazil has little in common, except the desire to weaken United States and other core countries as well. The approach to non-Western countries and the corresponding distance in relation to the US meant a noticeable change in the history of Brazil's foreign policy, which since the early twentieth century, has cultivated good relations with the United States. As the PT government cycle seems to have come to an end, foreign policy will return to its historical background and focus again on links with the United States and Europe. Thus, the BRICS will no longer be a priority.
In short, both in the economy and in foreign policy the structural conditions will again be imposed. In the economy, with the end of the developmental experiment, Brazil remains a semiperipheral country subject to the precepts of finance capital. With the end of PT's "active and bold" foreign policy, Brazil will once again give priority to the relations with the United States and Europe, because the connection to the U.S. production system, even if subordinate, is considered by the ruling classes as the most advantageous option for Brazil.
In this preliminary approach to the BRICS we could see, by examining one of its components, the relevance of considering the conjunctural and structural factors that both enable and constrain the initiatives of States. If these factors are not taken into consideration, we will be trapped in the short time with all its illusions. Further research will deepen the analysis that so far we have carried out with Brazil as a case in point and extend it to the other components of the BRICS. to which he wrote the chapter, "The World-Wconomy, Portugal and "Brazil" in the Long XVI
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